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ABSTRACT
Objectives: To develop a framework for deﬁning the potential value of
diagnostic testing, and discuss its implications for the health-care delivery
system.
Methods: We reviewed the conceptual and empirical literature related to
the valuing of diagnostic tests, and used this information to create a
framework for characterizing their value. We then made inferences about
the impact of this framework on health insurance coverage, health technol-
ogy assessment, physician–patient relationships, and public health policy.
Results: Three dimensions can effectively classify the potential value
created by diagnostic tests: 1) medical value (impact on treatment deci-
sions); 2) planning value (affect on patients’ ability to make better life
decisions); and 3) psychic value (how test information affects patients’
sense of self). This comprehensive framework for valuing diagnostics
suggests that existing health technology assessments may systematically
under- or overvalue diagnostics, leading to potentially incorrect conclu-
sions about cost-effectiveness. Further, failure to account for all value
dimensions may lead to distorted payments under a value-based health-
care system.
Conclusions: The potential value created by medical diagnostics incorpo-
rates medical value as well as value associated with well-being and plan-
ning. Consideration of all three dimensions has important implications for
technology assessment and value-based payment.
Keywords: cost-effectiveness analysis, health-care decision-makers, health
economics methods, value of information, willingness to pay.
Introduction
Health policy experts have called for a “value-based” US health-
care system in which providers would compete for patients on
the basis of price and quality, and payments would be based on
value provided rather than costs [1]. Although the impact of such
a system is uncertain, some have suggested that it could reduce
overall US health expenditures by as much as 30% without
adversely affecting medical outcomes [2]. Others note that value-
based approaches could encourage employees to choose healthier
lifestyles, higher-quality providers, and more effective treatments
[3]. They may also help to rationalize drug beneﬁts [4] and
enhance patients’ compliance with chronic medications [5]. As
one observer recently noted, “ ‘value-based’ is the preferred
health care preﬁx of our era [6].”
The success of a value-based system hinges on valid deﬁni-
tions and measures of value across the spectrum of health-care
services. This has largely been taken for granted, but there is not
yet a shared meaning of “value” or systems in place capable of
measuring it. Consider, for example, the current debate over
advanced diagnostic imaging. Physicians cite new imaging tech-
niques as an example of truly essential medical innovation [7,8];
however, some policymakers have questioned its value [9,10],
and rapid growth in spending for diagnostic services in the Medi-
care program has led to congressionally mandated reimburse-
ment cuts [11]. This disconnection between those convinced of
imaging’s value and those questioning it underscores the chal-
lenges of implementing a US value-based health-care system.
For surgical or pharmacological treatments, the concept of
value is relatively straightforward. Life expectancy and quality of
life have been measured—albeit with some controversy—using
standard health technology assessment techniques [12]. But as
Fryback and Thornbury have noted, these value measurement
techniques are more difﬁcult to apply to diagnostics because their
clinical impact depends upon the sequelae of clinical interven-
tions. In other words, diagnostics affect treatment decisions, and
treatment decisions affect outcomes [13]. Asch et al. further
observed that clinical impact alone is an insufﬁcient measure of
value for diagnostics because diagnostics also have the potential
to affect patients’ sense of psychic value whether or not they
affect treatment [14]. For example, a diagnostic test for dementia
may have relatively little impact on treatment or outcomes, but
may have a substantial effect on the patient’s psychic value.
This article has several objectives that contribute to the lit-
erature on the value of diagnostic tests. First, it seeks to highlight
the potential value of diagnostic testing for medical decision-
making. Second, the particular dimension of value on which we
focus is the value of diagnostic testing in resolving patients’
uncertainty about their medical conditions. This dimension of
value—what we term the “value of knowing”—has been largely
ignored in the cost-beneﬁt literature. But it is important to rec-
ognize this dimension of value, both for more accurate economic
evaluations of health-care treatments and technologies, and for
appropriate design of health insurance policies. A third aim is
to discuss the implications of this framework for policymaking,
health technology assessment, optimal insurance design, the
physician–patient relationship, and public health policy. Finally,
we explore the obstacles to measuring the value of diagnostics,
and offer some possible strategies for overcoming them.
DeﬁningValue for Diagnostics
Conceptually, a diagnostic test can be deﬁned as an information-
gathering exercise in health-care delivery. This can range from a
simple clinical assessment (e.g., observation, palpitation, blood
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pressure check) to an advanced in vitro or sophisticated diagnos-
tic imaging study. Regardless of type, diagnostics have the poten-
tial to create value along three dimensions (Fig. 1).
Medical Value
Medical value reﬂects a diagnostic’s ability to inform clinical
treatment. Examples include complete blood counts to detect
disease; mammograms to detect breast cancer; x-rays to diagnose
pneumonia; or magnetic resonance imaging to inform muscu-
loskeletal surgical decisions. The medical value of diagnostics is
typically evaluated using standard cost-effectiveness analysis
methods when the diagnosis–treatment link is direct; however,
patient preferences for treatment may not be well captured. A
patient who knows she is at risk for dementia may forego a
life-extending treatment with associated mortality or morbidity
risks because she may not want to trade off high-quality current
years for low-quality future years.
Planning Value
Planning value refers to a diagnostic test’s ability to inform
patients’ about choices on reproduction, work, retirement, long-
term health, ﬁnancial plans, and so on. Research has suggested,
for example, that many people would want to know early in life
if there were a gene that predicted whether they would eventually
contract Alzheimer’s disease, even in the absence of preventative
measures or treatment for the disease. On average, respondents
to one survey stated that they would be willing to pay several
hundred dollars for such a genetic test. When asked what they
would do with the test information, respondents pointed to
planning; for example, they would “sign advance directives,
spend more time with family, get their ﬁnances in order, and/or
buy long-term care insurance [15].”
Imagine a genetic test that could determine with certainty
whether one will eventually contract Huntington’s disease. From
a medical treatment perspective, this test has little value because
it does not affect treatment, but nevertheless, it could be highly
valued by a patient concerned about childbearing if she is at risk
for the disease based on family history. Even in the absence of
formal tests, clinicians and genetic counselors may use their
knowledge of genetics and epidemiology to help concerned fami-
lies gauge their chances of contracting a disease and to plan
accordingly.
Psychic Value
Psychic value captures how diagnostics can directly change
patients’ sense of satisfaction, and may yield either positive (good
news) or negative (bad news) value [14]. Although perhaps the
least-studied dimension of value, it could also be the most impor-
tant, especially for certain medical conditions where treatment is
unavailable or ineffective but knowledge of the disease can have
a profound impact on one’s sense of psychic value. Consider a
patient with lower back pain who is extremely concerned that the
pain may be indicative of a serious health-care condition, like
cancer. Although the medical value of advanced imaging for
initial, acute lower back pain is negligible [16], such a test may
have a very large psychic value for the patient.
Differences in the relative importance of these three dimen-
sions depend on the perspective of the affected party. For
example, medical value is likely to be more heavily weighted by
physicians based on their training, role in health-care decision-
making, and the fact that they do not directly beneﬁt ﬁnancially
from the pure value of knowing. Nevertheless, physicians would
not be expected to completely ignore the value of knowing
when they act as the patient’s agent. In contrast, the patient is
more likely to weigh the value of knowing and planning rela-
tively more heavily than the physician. Finally, payers are likely
to place the most weight on medical value and the least weight
on planning or psychic value because, beyond the general need
to keep customers satisﬁed with their health plan beneﬁts,
they receive little or no beneﬁt from these nonmedical value
dimensions.
Asch et al. provided perhaps the ﬁrst conceptual treatment of
the psychic value associated with diagnostics, which he coined
“knowing for knowing’s sake [14].” Asch et al. highlighted the
importance of different psychological impacts associated with
receiving equal amounts of good or bad news from a diagnostic
test. Although traditional economic theory would suggest that
patients apply the same value to equal increments of good and
bad news, behavioral economics incorporates the well-
documented phenomenon that patients are loss averse—they
need to be compensated more for bad news than they are willing
to pay for good news [17].
Recently, two of this article’s authors built on this fundamen-
tal insight to create a more general conceptual model for mea-
suring the psychic value of diagnostics, and used it to help
explain patients’ test-taking behavior [18]. The results of that
analysis revealed that the pure value of knowing from diagnostic
testing depends on test accuracy, pretest disease risk, the patient’s
discount rate, time to disease onset, the degree of a patient’s
worry about disease onset, and the patient’s aversion to receiving
bad news (loss aversion). As derived from that study, the pure
value of knowing increases (testing becomes more likely) under
certain conditions.
When tests are more accurate. The model predicted that less
accurate tests would have lower value, especially when resolving
inaccuracy is difﬁcult or expensive. This result aligns with empiri-
cal research showing that patients place higher value on more
accurate genetic tests for Alzheimer’s disease [15], cancer [19],
and Down’s syndrome [20]. Not all empirical evidence, however,
shows that accurate tests are more highly valued. Providing
patients with information about test accuracy was shown to have
no impact on willingness to pay for prostate cancer screening
[21] or whole-body PET scans for cancer [22].
When pretest expectation of bad news is low or the bad news is
not catastrophic or occurs far into the future. Consistent with
ﬁndings in both cognitive science and behavioral economics, this
result implies that patients value a diagnostic test most when the
chances and consequences of a bad outcome are relatively small.
In other words, patients tend to prefer tests that rule out rare
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Figure 1 Dimensions of diagnostic value.
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conditions, relatively benign diseases, or conditions that would
not occur until far into the future.
When patients do not worry as much about the onset of future
disease. Other things equal, patients who worry about a test
result value it less because of the unpleasant prospects of having
to “live with the disease.” Rather than undergoing diagnostic
testing to conﬁrm or deny the presence of a disease, worried
patients would prefer to remain ignorant by choosing not to be
tested. Consistent with this prediction, surveys on genetic testing
for Alzheimer’s reveal that more than two-thirds of those respon-
dents who say they would not choose to undergo the test cite
concern over “living with the burden of the disease [15].”
Because psychic value is intangible and not observable in
market exchange, this research points to methods for valuing
intangible assets or public goods to quantify psychic value. Alter-
native analytical approaches for measuring psychic value include
efforts to assess the value of knowing on quality of life, revealed
preference approaches based on consumer and insurer purchases
of diagnostic tests, and contingent valuation or “willingness to
pay.” Among these approaches, the contingent valuation tech-
nique has been identiﬁed as a potentially useful method for
measuring the value of diagnostics [23]. The advantage of con-
tingent valuation is that it captures not only the beneﬁts from
good news via willingness to pay for the test result, but also the
harm from bad news via willingness to accept the loss from an
unfavorable test outcome. By collecting both willingness to pay
and willingness to accept measures, the contingent valuation
method allows for a more comprehensive, albeit imperfect,
assessment of value [24].
Practical Impact?
Diagnostic testing has the potential to create value in all three
dimensions described earlier—medical, planning, and psychic
value—but the distribution of value across these dimensions will
vary from test to test. For example, the medical value of a
diagnostic for diseases where treatment options are limited, such
as Huntington’s disease or Alzheimer’s disease, is likely to be
small relative to the value it creates for planning or patients’
sense of psychic value. At the other extreme, the value from an
x-ray to diagnose a fracture is likely to have high medical value,
but little impact on patients’ sense of psychic value. Although
contingent valuation methods could apply to all diagnostic tests,
it may be prudent to reserve them for those tests where the
nonmedical value is likely to be substantial and missed by tradi-
tional technology assessment methods.
The net psychic value of a test may also be positive or nega-
tive, and will vary from patient to patient. Individual patients
value good and bad news differently, have different degrees of
loss aversion over bad test outcomes, and have varying degrees of
worry about disease onset—each of which factors into their
individual valuation calculus. For example, one study found that
7% of patients did not seek colorectal cancer screening because
of fear of learning that they might have cancer [25].
The extent to which diagnostics affect patient psychic value
also raises the possibility that diagnostics could be characterized,
in some cases, as therapeutics. If a patient is anxious over the
possibility that she may have HIV, Alzheimer’s disease, or some
other condition (the “worried well”), should he/she be prescribed
an anxiolytic or a diagnostic test?
Policy Implications
Accounting for the value of diagnostic testing has potentially
important implications for evaluating and ﬁnancing medical
treatments and technologies, physician–patient relationships,
and public health policy. In this section, we elaborate on each of
these issues.
Technology Assessment
Incorporating the psychic value of diagnostic tests into health
technology assessments could signiﬁcantly impact the estimated
beneﬁts of these technologies, and consequently the allocation
of health-care resources. To the extent that diagnostic testing
confers positive value, incorporating it into formal technology
assessments would generally improve the cost-effectiveness of
care that includes diagnostic tests. (To the extent that it confers
negative value, cost-effectiveness, of course, would worsen.)
From the standpoint of the efﬁcient allocation of resources,
moving toward more cost-effective interventions and away from
cost-ineffective interventions would be highly desirable.
Yet, despite its potential importance, the value of knowing
has typically not been included in economic evaluations of
medical treatments and technologies, for several reasons. First,
in some cases, the value of knowing may simply be too small
to have a meaningful effect on technology assessments. For
instance, Hirth and colleagues report that willingness to pay for
diagnostic certainty was low for peptic ulcer disease [26]. In all
likelihood, however, there are many instances where the value of
knowing is much higher. Rizzo and Lee found, for example, that
the value of knowing is substantial for highly accurate tests that
can rule out the presence of serious illnesses having a low prob-
ability of occurrence [18]. An example would be imaging studies
to rule out spinal cancer in patients with back pain. To be sure,
the low probability of spinal cancer argues against imaging to
rule out cancer; however, a full assessment of the test should
incorporate its value to the consumer, which includes the value of
diagnostic certainty.
Measurement issues present another barrier to using the value
of knowing in technology assessments. Discrete choice experi-
ments will be useful in helping to isolate the value of knowing
versus the value of health gain from treatments. Nevertheless,
obtaining accurate and reliable willingness to pay and willingness
to accept measures is challenging, as incentives to misrepresent
preferences, difﬁculty in placing dollar values on risks to life, and
other potential sources of bias are well known [23,24]. More-
over, the value of knowing is likely to be quite disease-speciﬁc,
and to depend on test cost, accuracy, and patient’s preferences.
Obtaining such information will be expensive and time consum-
ing, but the same could also be said for efforts to estimate quality
of life. Failure to develop and implement more accurate assess-
ments of the value of knowing runs the risk of under- or over-
stating the worth of diagnostic tests, both from the patient and
societal perspectives.
Payers may also be resistant to considering the value of
knowing when making decisions about which treatments to
include in beneﬁt packages. Market competition should provide
incentives for payers to meet the demands of their clients who do
value “knowing for knowing’s sake.” But it may be difﬁcult for
individual patients to quantify the value of knowing. Only more
and better evidence on the value of knowing, as well as better
patient education, can hope to overcome this informational
deﬁciency.
Optimal Insurance Design
Economic efﬁciency would require setting diagnostic payment
such that marginal beneﬁt equals marginal cost; however, beneﬁt
should be deﬁned broadly to include medical, planning, and
psychic value beneﬁts. Alternatively, society may not wish to pay
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for the full, nonmedical value of diagnostics. Instead, a system of
cost sharing tied to the nonmedical value of the diagnostic could
be employed. The result might be a value-based tiering system for
diagnostic tests similar to one proposed for pharmaceuticals [4].
For payers who rely on technology assessment, this approach
to understanding the value of diagnostic testing offers new
insights into how to accurately assess the cost-effectiveness of
treatments and, ultimately, how to design insurance plans. But
even the traditional approach to health-care technology assess-
ment of comparing procedure costs to medical beneﬁts has been
employed only to a limited degree to diagnostics [27], and has
excluded the potential nonmedical value of diagnostics alto-
gether. This omission could be particularly important in evaluat-
ing screening programs because even a very small nonmedical
beneﬁt summed over the vast majority of patients whose screen-
ing test is negative could signiﬁcantly impact whether the screen-
ing technology is cost effective.
Physician–Patient Relationships and Public Health Policy
Our results suggest that physicians should be mindful of how
they communicate pretest probabilities and the consequences of
positive ﬁndings, as both directly affect the value of knowing,
and hence patients’ willingness to undergo testing. On average,
patients will be more likely to undergo testing when their per-
ceived chances of a “bad” test result are low and their percep-
tions about the adverse consequences of such a result are
relatively benign. Test accuracy, and the likelihood of false nega-
tives and false positives, also bear on how patients value these
tests and should also be communicated to them carefully.
Understanding the value of knowing also has implications for
public health policy. For example, public health initiatives for
mass screening may be able to achieve higher compliance rates by
more accurately communicating pretest probabilities as well as
information on the consequences of receiving a diagnosis of the
disease. In particular, it is well known in the experimental psy-
chology literature that people systematically overestimate the
probability of rare but frightening events, such as earthquakes.
This is also likely to be the case for dreaded diseases like cancer,
especially rare but deadly forms of it. Furthermore, because the
psychic value of a screening test is inversely related to the adverse
consequences of detection, screening adherence rates have the
potential to be improved if the real or perceived consequences of
having the object disease are lower. As an example, our frame-
work would suggest that development of improved HIV treat-
ment would lead to increased screening. Overall, health
education to assist the public in understanding pretest probabili-
ties and health-care consequences associated with public health
issues would be very valuable.
Finally, policymakers must be aware that tests that confer
psychic value to the patient may also promote unhealthy lif-
estyles. For example, normal liver enzymes in a patient that
abuses alcohol, normal cholesterol tests for an obese patient, and
a clear chest x-ray in a smoker may provide incentives to con-
tinue to engage in unhealthy lifestyles.
Conclusions
There are many challenges in incorporating all dimensions of
diagnostic value—medical, planning, and psychic value—into
health-care technology assessments. Nevertheless, failure to do
so runs the risk of biasing economic evaluations, leading to the
misallocation of health-care resources. This problem will only
become more widespread as the number of new diagnostic tests
proliferates. Thus, it is now critical to consider strategies that
promote more and better evidence on the value of knowing, and
to use this information in health-care technology assessments.
These strategies include promoting and ﬁnancing research on the
value of knowing, and educating government and payers that the
value of knowing may really matter to patients.
In terms of research, more empirical evidence is needed. Such
evidence may be obtained using a willingness to pay, willingness
to accept framework, as outlined by Rizzo and Lee [18]. Ideally,
this effort should be disease-speciﬁc, and should recognize con-
sumer heterogeneity; that is, consumers will likely place differ-
ential value on “knowing for knowing’s sake” because they differ
in terms of their attitudes toward risk, time preference, the extent
to which they will worry about adverse future outcomes, and
other dimensions. Obviously, funding will be required to realize
this research agenda. Given the public interest in quantifying this
outcome, public funding sources may play a key initial role in
helping to reﬁne methodologies to ascertain evidence on the
value of knowing and promoting initial surveys that are designed
to assess the value of knowing for speciﬁc diseases and tests.
Psychic value from knowing may also be present in other
types of medical services apart from diagnostic tests. For
example, seeing a specialist may be reassuring even if it has no
effect on treatment. Similarly, a placebo effect from a drug may
confer psychic value although it does not improve medical
outcomes.
Enabling the transformation to a broad value-based system
will require well-grounded measurements of the value of all
health-care services, including diagnostics. Building on the con-
ceptual framework presented here, it should be possible to
measure the value of diagnostics with better accuracy than
current methods permit. Doing so can support more effective
payment policies, technology assessments, clinical decisions, and
public health campaigns.
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